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Abstract—The bloom of the fifth generation (5G) communi-
cation and beyond serves as a catalyst for physical layer key
generation techniques. In 5G communications systems, many
challenges in traditional physical layer key generation schemes,
such as co-located eavesdroppers, the high bit disagreement ratio,
and high temporal correlation, could be overcome. This paper
lists the key-enabler techniques in 5G wireless networks, which
offer opportunities to address existing issues in physical layer
key generation. We survey the existing key generation methods
and introduce possible solutions for the existing issues. The
new solutions include applying the high signal directionality
in beamforming to resist co-located eavesdroppers, utilizing the
sparsity of millimeter wave (mmWave) channel to achieve a low
bit disagreement ratio under low signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR), and
exploiting hybrid precoding to reduce the temporal correlation
among measured samples. Finally, the future trends of physical
layer key generation in 5G and beyond communications are
discussed.
This work has been accepted by the IEEE Wireless Communications Magazine.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the fifth generation (5G) com-
munication has come a long way, thanks to the booming
wireless technologies, such as millimeter wave (mmWave),
massive MIMO, highly directional beamforming, and hybrid
precoding [1]. Compared with the current 4G network, 5G
networks can satisfy the increasing demand by providing a
high data rate, ultra reliable low latency, and massive machine
type communications. In the design of 5G networks, providing
reliable and secure communication service is one of the top
priorities. Specifically, in this article, we focus on one of the
promising physical layer security mechanisms - physical layer
key generation, and explore the benefits offered by the new
technologies applied in 5G wireless networks.
Different from the traditional Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key ex-
change mechanism, physical layer key generation mechanisms
do not require expensive computation and have the potential to
achieve information-theoretic security [2]. That is, the secrecy
of the generated key is not dependent on the hardness of
a computational problem but relies on the physical laws of
the wireless fading channels. For instance, wireless devices
measure highly correlated wireless channel characteristics and
use them as shared random sources to generate a shared key
[3]. In theory, in a rich multi-path scattering environment,
a passive eavesdropper who is more than a half-wavelength
away from legitimate users will obtain un-correlated channel
measurements, thus cannot infer much information about the
generated key.
Physical layer key generation has gained much attention
in literature [4]. Based on the number of antennas in the
transceivers, physical layer key generation schemes under sub-
6GHz can be generally classified into two categories: single
antenna and MIMO based key generation. In single-antenna
based mechanisms, various channel characteristics have been
proposed to generate the secret key, including received signal
strength (RSS) [5], channel state information (CSI) [4] and
angle of arrival (AoA) [6]. In MIMO based mechanisms,
works in [7] conducted an indoor MIMO measurement in
the 2.51-2.59GHz band and studied the number of available
key bits in both line-of-sight (LoS) and non-line-of-sight
(NLoS) environments. In [7], a theoretical upper bound for
the maximum size of the generated secret key is derived
based on the mutual information of channel estimates at the
two legitimate nodes. But the number of antennas considered
is still relatively small and the carrier frequency is not as
high as mmWave. Furthermore, all the theoretical analysis are
based on the Gaussian channel assumption which cannot be
directly utilized in mmWave channels because of their unique
scattering nature [8], [9].
Although significant efforts and progress of physical layer
key generation have been made in recent years, many issues or
challenges still remain elusive. For example, most existing key
generation schemes cannot combat the co-located eavesdrop-
ping in sub-6GHz systems. That is, a common assumption that
eavesdroppers locate at least a half of wavelength apart from
legitimate users is required in most key generation schemes.
Furthermore, some existing works have a high bit disagree-
ment ratio in the low SNR regime, which leads to a high
reconciliation overhead and low efficiency of key generation.
In addition, a high probing rate is chosen to increase the key
generation rate in most of the existing works, however, it will
lead to the high temporal correlation among samples along
with a large number of repeated quantization bits.
With unique features, 5G and beyond technologies may offer
a better solution to such aforementioned issues or challenges
remained in existing works. For instance, the high directional-
ity enabled by massive MIMO based beamforming is exploited
in [10] to defend against co-located eavesdroppers in key
generation. Besides, authors developed a scheme by utilizing
the sparsity of mmWave channel to estimate virtual angle of
arrival (AoA) and angle of departure (AoD) [6]. Due to the
sparsity of mmWave channel, the scheme is anti-noise and
can achieve a low bit disagreement ratio. Moreover, based on
the fact that hybrid precoding can form mmWave beams with
multiple resolutions, it can be adopted in the channel probing
stage to reduce the temporal correlation among samples.
By identifying possible solutions and benefits offered by 5G
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communication technologies, the purpose of this paper is to
provide new insights about the physical key generation in 5G
wireless networks and is expected to advance and stimulate the
corresponding research under the context of 5G and beyond
communication systems. It should be noted that existing survey
and tutorial papers [4] on physical layer key generation mainly
focus on sub-6GHz systems. A comprehensive study of phys-
ical layer key generation in 5G wireless networks, identifying
challenges and opportunities, is still lacked, which is the major
contribution of this paper.
In Section II, we introduce the basic of key generation
and analyze limitations of existing works. In Section III,
the specific benefits or improvements accompanied with 5G
communication systems are discussed. In Section IV, we show
the benefits of 5G communication technologies on physical
layer key generation with three typical cases. The future trends
and research topics are discussed in Section V, while the
conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. KEY GENERATION AND EXISTING ISSUES
In this section, we review the typical key generation pro-
cess and analyze the limitations of existing schemes. Here,
two devices, denoted by Alice and Bob, wish to generate
a common secret key based on channel measurements. To
extract the secret key, Alice and Bob generally perform five
steps: channel probing, randomness extraction, quantization,
information reconciliation, and privacy amplification.
A. Typical Key Generation Process
• Channel Probing: In this step, Alice and Bob exchange
channel probing signals with each other to collect enough
channel measurements as a shared random source. The
channel measurements can be CSI, phase, or AoA and
AoD. If the channel reciprocity holds, the received mea-
surements at Alice and Bob are highly correlated.
• Randomness Extraction: The received signals at Alice
and Bob may contain deterministic parts that can be
inferred by an attacker. Randomness extraction is adopted
here to remove deterministic parts and extract randomness
of the channel fading.
• Quantization: This is used to quantize the random chan-
nel measurements into the binary bits.
• Information Reconciliation: Information reconciliation
is a form of error correction carried out between Alice
and Bob to ensure identical keys generated separately on
both sides. The extracted bits at Alice and Bob sides after
quantization are usually not identical due to imperfect
reciprocity and measurement noise. During reconciliation,
Alice and Bob exchange side information to correct
errors, and a certain amount of bit information could be
revealed to the eavesdropper.
• Privacy Amplification: This step is used to eliminate
the leaked bits during channel probing and reconciliation.
After this step, eavesdropper’s partial information by
observation will be reduced largely.
B. Limitations in Existing Schemes
Although there have already been various studies of physical
layer key generation for sub-6GHz systems, there remain
Fig. 1. Key generation for mmWave Massive MIMO with multi-resolution
beams
several grave challenges and limitations for the existing key
generation schemes in practice. We list three challenges existed
in previous works.
• Co-located Attacks: The correlation of channel mea-
surements is determined by the distance between the
eavesdropper and Alice/Bob. In the existing works [3],
[4], if the eavesdropper is co-located to Alice or Bob,
he/she will observe channel measurements that are highly
correlated with Alice or Bob. Therefore, most existing
works are vulnerable to co-located eavesdroppers. How to
design a security-proven physical key generation scheme
under co-located attacks has not been well explored.
• High Bit Disagreement Ratio in Low SNR Regimes:
The similarity of channel measurements at Alice and Bob
is highly determined by the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR)
level. In low SNR regimes, the noise leads to a high
bit disagreement ratio after quantization, which could
cause a high reconciliation overhead and thus lead to
a low key generation rate. Generally, existing works try
to decrease the bit disagreement ratio by enhancing the
SNR or reducing the quantization level. Obviously, a
scheme achieving a low bit disagreement ratio in low
SNR regimes is desired.
• High Temporal Correlation: In previous works, in order
to increase the key generation rate, a high probing rate is
adopted in channel probing stage to obtain more channel
measurements, which can be quantized into more binary
bits. However, within the coherence time, the temporal
channel measurements are highly correlated, which leads
to duplicated key bits. Apparently, a scheme that can
maintain a high probing rate while reducing the temporal
correlation is of great interest.
III. 5G-ENABLED SECURE AND EFFICIENT KEY
GENERATION
Before we point out the solution to the existing issues in key
generation, we first introduce some disruptive technologies in
5G wireless networks. The opportunities and challenges of key
generation based on these technologies are then discussed.
A. mmWave Communication
In 5G wireless networks, mmWave communication systems
with the frequency range of 30-300 GHz, are considered as
a promising solution to increase communication capacity, i.e.,
mmWave cellular systems will enable gigabit-per-second data
rates thanks to the large bandwidth available at mmWave
frequencies. But Radio Frequency (RF) signals in mmWave
communication has a short transmission range due to its heavy
free-space path loss.
That may restrict the ability of the eavesdroppers because
passive eavesdroppers need to be aware of her/his distance to
the legitimate user [1]. In other words, the information leakage
of the key generation process in mmWave communication is
more sensitive to the location than the sub-6GHz systems.
Different from sub-6GHz systems, which model the corre-
lation of channel as Jake’s correlation model [11], mmWave
channel is location-specific and cannot be directly modeled
as Jake’s model. The proper eavesdropping model is under-
explored. Besides, the propagation of mmWave at high fre-
quency has a higher outage probability compared with sub-
6GHz systems. The blockage effect of mmWave has effects
on physical layer key generation and needs to be considered
in the future analysis of secrecy key rate.
B. Beamforming (BF) and Massive MIMO
BF, typically realized with the antenna array, can be applied
to provide a high antenna gain and mitigate the severe path loss
at mmWave frequencies. In BF, the phase of antenna elements
is adaptively shifted to form a concentrated and directed beam
pattern [12].
In sub-6GHz systems, the BF is usually performed with
several antenna elements in an antenna array. In mmWave
communication, the number of antenna elements in the antenna
array is greatly increased to enlarge the antenna gain of
BF. MIMO systems with a great number of antennas are
named ”Massive MIMO”. Thanks to the small wavelength of
mmWave signals, a large number of antenna elements can be
packaged on a chip. For example, in [13], the author proposes
a small antenna array (40mm × 41mm) with 256 antenna
elements, which thus enables the tiny antenna array to be
embedded in Tx and Rx.
Massive MIMO based BF brings many benefits for physical
layer key generation. At first, the ability of eavesdroppers
is limited. The power level in Massive MIMO is reduced
which cuts the SNR received at eavesdroppers. Apart from
this, the massive MIMO can generate very narrow beams by
focusing on legitimate users without spilling over the signal
power in other directions [14]. Due to the narrow beamwidth,
an eavesdropper without beam tracking capabilities has high
probabilities to lose eavesdropping links due to the factors like
slight rotation of the antenna array [10]. On the contrary, the
beam tracking techniques are required at the eavesdroppers to
maintain a high SNR while eavesdropping.
The main challenge accompanied with massive MIMO is the
large channel estimation overhead. In existing works, most of
the schemes usually choose the CSI as common randomness
for physical layer key generation, which, however, is nontrivial
to obtain in mmWave systems with massive MIMO. The large
number of antenna elements causes large channel estimation
overhead [15]. Consequently, if Alice and Bob need to do
bi-directional probing for channel estimation, the efficiency
of key generation is going to be affected by large channel
estimation overhead, which is needed to be tackled with in
future research. New schemes to combat these issues need to
be investigated.
C. Hybrid precoding
Due to the short wavelength of mmWave, massive MIMO is
quite promising for mmWave systems since antenna elements
can be packaged on a chip. The increasing number of an-
tenna elements requires a larger phase array shifter networks.
However, the number of beamforming chains controlling phase
shifter array cannot be increased linearly with the number of
antenna elements. In order to provide a high precoding gain
with less RF chains, the hybrid precoding structure is proposed
[15].
In this paper, we propose a physical layer key genera-
tion scheme by utilizing the hybrid precoding structure for
mmWave Massive MIMO systems, as depicted in Fig. 1. The
hybrid precoder is the combination of an analog precoder
in RF domain and a digital precoder in baseband domain.
The RF precoder is composed of several analog phase shifter
networks. In the digital domain, the baseband precoder is
usually designed by using compressive sensing techniques.
For each round of bi-directional probing, Alice/Bob would
select the beams with different resolutions and angles. After
all probings and getting enough samples, Alice and Bob would
perform the remaining steps of physical layer key generation.
As depicted in Fig. 1, a multi-resolution codebook is utilized
for precoding in our proposed scheme and it enables Alice and
Bob to provide the multi-resolution beams in the quantized
angle space. Our scheme based on hybrid precoding can
reduce the high temporal correlation under the high sampling
rate in the following two aspects, the steering angle and the
beam resolution. At first, by extracting every multi-path in
the sparse mmWave channels, hybrid-precoding based key
generation scheme can reduce the high temporal correlation
of the channel measurements. The multi-paths belonging to
different clusters experience independent scattering effects and
thus possess independent statistical information. Such effect
thus can degrade the temporal correlation among channel
measurements and improve the key generation rate. Secondly,
by adopting different beam resolutions in each round of bi-
directional probing, the temporal correlation can be further
decreased. For each round of the bi-directional probing, the
received signal in each round can be viewed as a weighted
combination of multi-paths. By adjusting the beam resolution
in each round, the weights on multi-paths can be affected.
Selecting appropriate beam resolution can further reduce the
temporal correlation. The performance of the proposed scheme
will be given and discussed in section IV-C.
Although hybrid precoding is promising in key generation,
the challenges associated with hybrid precoding cannot be
ignored. The precoding gain of hybrid precoding is superposed
by the analog precoder and baseband precoder. The precoding
errors can be introduced due to the imperfection of analog
components and thus need to be considered in the theoretical
analysis of secrecy key rate.
IV. IMPROVING SECURITY OF PHYSICAL LAYER KEY
GENERATION IN MMWAVE MASSIVE MIMO SYSTEMS
The implementation of physical layer key generation in
mmWave massive MIMO communication systems is highly re-
warding. In this section, we will discuss the benefits from three
specific cases: countering co-located eavesdroppers, achieving
a low bit disagreement ratio under low SNR, and reducing the
temporal correlation under the high probing rates.
A. Countering Co-located Eavesdroppers with High Direc-
tional Beams
In mmWave systems, transceivers deploy narrow beams with
the high directionality to suppress the interference from neigh-
bors, which means eavesdroppers on the sidelobes have a very
low SNR. In order to achieve a high SNR, the eavesdroppers
in mmWave systems will approach legitimate transceivers as
close as possible, which may bring threats for current physical
layer key generation schemes, where it mainly relies on the
location decorrelation to ensure security.
Enabled by the massive MIMO based beamforming tech-
niques, the high directionality of beams offers a solution to
counter the co-located eavesdroppers. In [10], we developed a
key generation scheme for mmWave massive MIMO commu-
nication systems called ”Secret Beam”, where small random
perturbation angles on the beamformer are chosen as the
common random source. The overall process in ”Secret Beam”
includes the following steps: inter-perturbation, quantization,
and XOR operation.
Due to the sparsity of mmWave channel and the narrow
beam width of the massive MIMO communication system, the
eavesdropper needs to approach to Alice or Bob so that the
narrow beams from certain directions can be received. For the
eavesdropper being co-located with Alice/Bob, Alice and Bob
conduct the inter-probing strategy and adjust the perturbation
on BF vectors to perform key generation. In the worst case, the
eavesdropper may get the same bits with Alice or Bob but not
both. However, the eavesdropper by no means can determine
the key which is the result by XORing bits generated at Alice
and Bob sides.
The mmWave massive MIMO system adopts analog phase-
shifter with a single radio-frequency (RF) chain. We discussed
the uniform planar array (UPA) adopted at Alice and Bob sides
with two dimensions, 32 × 16 and 16 × 8. The narrowband
mmWave operates on 28 GHz and the channel reciprocity
holds in the coherence time. The mmWave channel contains
a LoS path and an NLoS path, where the amplitude of NLoS
path is typically 10dB weaker than the LoS path.
In Fig. 2, we compared the bit agreement ratio (BAR) in
two cases with a fixed quantization level of 16. In the first
case, the dimensions of UPA at Alice and Bob sides are 32
and 16, respectively (i.e., 32× 16) and the blue curve marked
with circles represents the BARs under different SNRs. In the
second case, the blue curve marked with diamonds represents
the BARs while adopting the smaller antenna number 16× 8
at Alice and Bob side. We can observe that a higher BAR can
Fig. 2. The bit agreement ratio under the co-located eavesdroppers
be achieved with more antenna elements. There are four red
curves represents four different cases, where the eavesdropper
can either be co-located with Alice or Bob under two antenna
dimensions (32× 16 or 16× 8). Based on the four red curves,
we can observe that the eavesdroppers BAR in four cases
after XOR operation is around 50% under various SNRs. As a
result, this scheme is robust against a co-located eavesdropper.
B. Achieving a Low Bit Disagreement Ratio under Low SNR
Regimes
A high bit disagreement ratio after the channel sounding can
greatly increase the reconciliation overhead and slow down the
key generation rate. For example, if the existing reconciliation
cascade algorithm is used to reconcile two bit strings with a
10% bit mismatch rate, 60% of bits need to be discarded [6].
Therefore, having a low bit mismatch before reconciliation is
critical in physical layer key generation.
In low SNR environments, existing works utilize a low
quantization level to achieve the high key agreement ratio.
However, in these schemes, fewer bits are quantized due to the
low quantization level, which results in a low key generation
rate. In contrast, we proposed a new key generation scheme
in [6] exploiting the sparsity of mmWave Massive MIMO
channel and the virtual AoAs and AoDs to obtain a high bit
agreement ratio (BAR) (99%) even under low SNR regimes.
In the mmWave massive MIMO channel, virtual AoAs/AoDs
are transformed from physical AoAs/AoDs after projecting
the mmWave channel onto the unitary matrix, as the virtual
channel matrix. In this way, we can observe that the entries
corresponding to physical AoAs/AoDs are with the large
amplitudes, as well as virtual AoAs and AoDs associated with
physical AoAs and AoDs. On the other hand, if the entries
in virtual channel matrix are not corresponding to physical
AoAs/AoDs, the amplitudes are very small. In [6], for each
side (Alice or Bob), the virtual AoAs and AoDs are estimated
and selected as the common randomness. The sparsity reflected
in the virtual angle domain makes the estimation process
of virtual AoAs/AoDs against noise, which enables virtual
Fig. 3. Bit disagreement ratio for channel estimate quantization and virtual
AoAs and AoDs while Nt = Nr = 128
AoAs/AoDs estimated at Alice and Bob to be highly identical.
Consequently, quantized bits at Alice and Bob have a low bit
disagreement ratio within low SNR regimes.
Fig. 3 denotes the performance of the scheme achieving
a low bit disagreement ratio. Using the quantization method
in work [7], virtual AoAs and AoDs based key generation
scheme achieves a very low bit disagreement ratio under low
SNR regimes. For example, we compare bit disagreement ratio
under two antenna dimensions: 128× 128 and 64× 64, where
Alice has 128 or 64 antenna elements and Bob has 128 or
64 antenna elements, respectively. The blue curves represent
the bit disagreement ratio of the scheme in [6] under different
antenna dimensions and multi-path numbers. The red curves
represent bit disagreement ratio of existing scheme with the
antenna dimensions 128 × 128. L represents the number of
multi-paths. The numerical result shows that the scheme [6]
achieves much lower bit disagreement ratio than the existing
scheme [7]. For instance, when we consider the case where
Alice and Bob have 128 antenna elements with L = 3, the
bit disagreement ratio is under 10−2 even when the SNR is
-10dB, which outperforms the existing schemes.
C. Reducing Temporal Correlation under a High Probing Rate
Using Multi-resolution Beams
Even though a high channel probing rate provides more
samples in a period of time, the key generation rate is not
increased linearly to the probing rate. Within the coherence
time, a high probing frequency leads to the temporal redun-
dancy along with a large number of repeated bits. In order to
reduce the temporal correlation among samples, the random
initial phase can be set to achieve multiple probes in one
coherence time. However, it cannot be against noise and thus
cannot reduce the temporal correlation under a low SNR value.
Hybrid precoding is popular in mmWave massive MIMO
channel estimation, where it not only enables the codebook
design for mmWave massive MIMO systems but also facil-
Fig. 4. Key entropy rate
itates beam width adjustment in an easy way. The beams
with adjustable width may focus on different multi-path and
angles, which can reduce the correlation among the samples
of the channel gain. Thus, we propose a scheme utilizing
the multi-resolution beams in the channel probing stage to
reduce the temporal correlation as illustrated in Fig. 1. In our
simulation, the hybrid precoding scheme is implemented using
the hierarchical codebook, while the system operates at 28GHz
where Alice has 64 antennas and Bob has 32 antennas and
a uniformly quantized phase shifter is considered. In Fig. 1,
Alice selects beams with different resolutions or angles to send
probing sequences, while Bob uses a fixed beam pattern in
the coherence time. The beams are carefully selected from the
hierarchical codebook to maintain the channel gain within a
certain range, which enables this scheme to work under the
low SNR regime.
Fig. 4 illustrates the key entropy rate. In the coherence time,
if we use 5 beams with different resolutions and angles (P=5).
From the figure, we can observe that, the key entropy rate
approaches to 1 as the increasing of SNR for the fixed beam.
However, our scheme has the key entropy rate approximately 5
times of the fixed beams and thus can reduce the temporal cor-
relation efficiently. The channel probing with multi-resolution
beams can reduce the temporal correlation among samples, so
as to further improve the key generation rate with the carefully
selected beams combinations. Besides, the issue that how to
maintain the channel gain in a certain range is critical because
a big fluctuation of channel gain can affect the key generation
rate.
V. FUTURE TOPICS
In this section, we discuss the potential research directions
and future trends of physical-layer key generation for 5G and
beyond, including the mobility effect on key generation, multi-
user massive MIMO and backscatter communication.
A. The Effect of Mobility on Key Generation
In mmWave communication, the high path loss and limited
scattering effects lead to a high blockage rate. In such case, the
mobility patterns of users may have an effect on physical layer
key generation. How to maintain a stable key generation rate
under this case is an open problem. Besides, beam tracking
is developed in mmWave communication to maintain the
communication link. Existing key generation scheme needs
to consider the effect of beam tracking.
B. Multi-user Massive MIMO
To have an efficient system performance, each base station is
expected to serve a number of mobile stations, simultaneously.
Thus, hybrid precoding is popular to multiplex different data
streams to different users. Digital precoding layer in hybrid
precoding structure provides more freedom to reduce the
interference among users. In this case, when it comes to
physical layer group key generation problem, hybrid precoding
may offer an opportunity to decrease the interference from
other users and to maximize the group key generation rate.
However, the problems like how to decrease the channel
estimation overhead in the group key generation and how to
optimally tune channel probing rate and power need further
investigations.
C. Backscatter Communication
Backscatter communication is an important enabling tech-
nology for Internet of Things (IoT) because of its ultra-low
power consumption and lower manufacturing cost. Based on
this new technique, IoT devices can transmit data by reflect-
ing and modulating incident radio frequency (RF) signals
without any power-thirsty RF transmitter. In addition, the
newest ambient backscatter communications do not rely on
any dedicated RF base station, but utilize ambient RF signals,
such as TV radio, cellular, and Wi-Fi to communicate with
other devices. However, in such scenarios, the devices cannot
directly measure the channel characteristics among themselves
as shared randomness to generate secret keys, which makes the
conventional physical layer key generation approaches inap-
plicable. In massive MIMO mmWave backscatter systems, the
special channel model, such as round-trip multi-path channel
and dyadic backscatter channel, will bring new challenges
and opportunities to exact randomness for shared secret key
generation. Thus, a new physical key generation schemes in
backscatter communications should be considered to obtain a
secret key with low computation and communication overhead.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reviewed the existing physical layer key
generation schemes, and discussed the limitations and opportu-
nities in 5G and beyond. Through three case studies, including
combating co-located eavesdroppers, achieving a low bit dis-
agreement ratio within low SNR regimes, and reducing tem-
poral correlation under high probing rates, we demonstrated
the benefits offered by 5G communication technologies for
physical layer key generation. We also discussed the future
topics and potential research trends related to physical-layer
key generation in 5G and beyond.
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